Since it emerged in the years following World War II, conservatism in America has been declared intellectually and politically victorious—and dead—many times over. As a new, self-conscious intellectual movement, postwar conservatism was launched through the publication of groundbreaking books, including Friedrich Hayek’s *Road to Serfdom* (1944), Richard Weaver’s *Ideas Have Consequences* (1948), and Russell Kirk’s *Conservative Mind* (1953); the establishment of new, opinion-shaping periodicals, such as *Human Events* (1944) and William F. Buckley Jr.’s *National Review* (1955); and the formation of organizations such as the Foundation for Economic Education (1946) and the Young Americans for Freedom (1960). Nevertheless, conservatism in America still has been defined, for many, by its political rather than its intellectual fortunes: Barry Goldwater’s dramatically unsuccessful 1964 presidential bid and Ronald Reagan’s equally dramatic but successful 1980 run for the presidency are usually portrayed as defining moments for American conservatism, with the first ironically paving the way for the second. Since the election of Reagan, the political ups and downs of the conservative movement in America have continued: the so-called “Republican Revolution” of 1994, for example, has left in its wake an ambiguous legacy, including the impeachment of a Democratic president, growing deficits, a war fought overseas in the name of democracy, and a splintering of the conservative movement.

Conservatism’s mixed political fortunes, along with the often acrimonious debates that have persisted among the critics of postwar American society, including neoconservatives, paleoconservatives, traditionalists, libertarians, and those who simply call themselves “conservatives,” reveal a continuing crisis of identity among Americans on the political right. One reason for this crisis may be a lack of historical knowledge and perspective. This is too bad, for the most interesting intellectual debates in the last fifty years have arguably taken place.
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not between conservatives and liberals but between adherents of different positions within the conservative camp. George Nash’s *Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945* (revised ed., 1996) provides a masterful narrative history of conservatism, but there has as yet been no comprehensive treatment of the different elements of conservatism in all their conflicting and complementary variety. As Pepperdine University political theorist Ted V. McAlister has pointed out, “The historiography of American conservatism . . . remains immature. For decades, the academic historical establishment largely ignored American conservatives or dealt with them as a sort of fringe group. Only after the surprising and enduring appeal of Ronald Reagan did most historians begin to take serious scholarly notice of self-proclaimed conservatives. Slowly, the historical literature is growing richer. But for now, the story of conservatism in America, as told by the academics, is fractured and inconclusive.” This volume is intended to contribute to the ongoing effort to understand what it has meant—and still means—to be a conservative in America.

The editors do not see in the history of conservatism the inevitable development of an increasingly powerful and coherent ideology of any kind, nor do they believe in the inevitable triumph of any particular set of policy positions. This eschewal of ideological clarity may leave some readers of this encyclopedia dissatisfied. Indeed, the reader will not get very far in this volume before beginning to notice the tensions and outright contradictions that exist and have ever existed among conservatives—on matters of principle no less than on matters of policy. If it has been marked by anything, conservatism in America has clearly been marked by diversity. How is it, then, that such a range of views came to be associated with a single social-political philosophy?

The full answer to that question is complex. It is true, as has been often stated, that from 1945 to 1991 conservatism, as a political movement, was held together primarily by the glue of anticommunism. But then there also were many staunch liberal anticommunists (e.g., Lionel Trilling) and even some staunch radical anticommunists (e.g., George Orwell). Furthermore, there were even anti-anticommunists among conservatives and their fellow travelers (e.g., John Lukacs). So, while anticommunism provided a center of gravity for the conservative intellectual movement, there must be more to the story.

The realities of coalition politics in a vast, diverse country like the United States provide part of the answer. For with the effort to elect Barry Goldwater, American postwar conservatism became a political movement as much as a political philosophy. And practical political movements are founded on compro-
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mism. Of course, such compromises are susceptible to explanation. Thus Frank Meyer’s well known “fusionism” served for decades as a kind of justification for conservatism as a political coalition. Through “fusionism,” Meyer and those who followed him argued that the great goals of life are freedom and virtue, and that in order for virtue, the special concern of traditionalists, to be authentic, it must be attained in a context of maximal individual freedom, the special concern of libertarians. In turn, argued Meyer, freedom may only claim our moral allegiance insofar as its ultimate purpose is to allow men and women to attain virtue. Thought of in this way, libertarians and traditionalists could be understood to pursue much the same practical ends for human beings.

This fusionist philosophy has in fact played a large role in uniting conservatives at the level of public policy debate and practice. Rapidly embraced by National Review and other movement-shaping organs, fusionism is today the implicit background philosophy of most conservative institutions, politicians, journalists, and activists. And why not? As an inclusive doctrine it has inestimable practical advantages. But at the level of theory fusionism has always remained controversial. Indeed, with the exception of the nuanced treatment it has received at the hands of M. Stanton Evans, it has remained largely unelaborated. Traditionalists, for their part, argue that it is a tradition of ordered liberty that they defend, and not just virtue, which often flourishes under the worst, most brutal and unfree circumstances; saints may be found in concentration camps, even as good people may be led astray by libertines. Then, too, there is the problem that thoroughgoing libertarians have often remained agnostic as to whether the end of freedom is really virtue, as Meyer claimed; for former Reason editor Virginia Postrel, for example, freedom is an end in itself, and if individuals decide to use it to attain virtue, that is their business.

Thus, while Meyer’s fusionism may be largely responsible for providing a practical foundation for the conservative political coalition, it has not succeeded in providing a unifying theoretical basis for the conservative intellectual movement. Does, then, such a basis exist?

Perhaps the suggestive analysis of sociologist Philip Rieff offers one possible approach to this question of what might unite conservatives at the level of theory. In Rieff’s typology of the succession of ideal character types in the history of the West, the political man of the Greeks was replaced by the religious man of the Hebrews and Christians and finally by the short-lived, transitional character of the economic man of the Enlightenment. Economic man was short-lived because a new type, psychological man, displaced him near the beginning of the twentieth century. And, as Rieff argues, this new man was quite different from
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the preceding three, in that he no longer recognized the existence of a hierarchy of impulses in man’s nature. In other words, psychological man is similar to the “mass man” whose advent Ortega described and conservatives of all stripes have feared. Accepting no hierarchy “imposed” from a source outside the sovereign self, mass man is too easily manipulated by the state—with its twin promises of security and freedom—into detaching himself from those mediating institutions which not only present obstacles to the state’s consolidation of power, but also provide the self with its ethical education. The abstractions of ideology fuel the engine of this manipulation by bringing the atomized individual into conformance with the needs of the new therapeutic social and political order.

Although they do not typically think of the matter in this way, it could be argued that different sorts of conservatives have held, and continue to hold, different beliefs as to which of the character types described by Rieff represents a superior human ideal. For many of the followers of Leo Strauss and some neoconservatives, it is political man; for most traditional Jews and Christians, it is religious man; for libertarians and other neoconservatives, economic man represents an authentic characterological advance. Probably most theorists regarded as essentially conservative would regard a hybrid of two or three of these types as the best option of all (leave aside for now whether such a hybrid is really possible). But if Rieff is correct that psychological or mass man became the characteristic American type in the twentieth century, opposition to his elevation as the human ideal—and the concomitant rejection of any notion of an ethical or moral hierarchy in human desire and action—may be the most important thing that has united American conservatives.

Indeed, it might be said that conservatives of all stripes have regarded acquiescence in the advent of mass man to form the core of what they have opposed and often labeled as “liberalism.” Their common opposition to the enthronement of mass man and all that his ascension entails provides, perhaps, enough shared philosophical ground that the postwar conservative intellectual movement has not been simply a convenient political arrangement.

Whether this shared revolt against the masses is sufficient to maintain conservatism’s viability as a movement remains open to question. New, fundamental questions about man and society must now engage the conservative imagination, including Islamic terrorism, the economic and political rise of China, the advancing frontier of biotechnology, the emergence of transnational bureaucracies and the corresponding deemphasis of nation-states, the ongoing erosion of our constitutional order, challenges to the traditional understanding of marriage and family, increasing ecological concerns, and the deterioration of
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American community life. In other words, history is living—but so is the conservative tradition. We hope that in the face of these challenges, this encyclopedia will serve as a touchstone for those seeking resources in conservatism’s American past.

American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia (hereafter ACE) seeks not to establish any orthodox definition of conservatism but rather to offer information and insight on the persons, schools, concepts, organizations, events, publications, and other topics of major importance to the nature and development of the conservative intellectual movement in America since World War II. Its 626 entries—ranging, in the main, from 250 to 2,500 words in length—cover social issues from abortion to welfare, thinkers from Lord Acton to Donald Atwell Zoll, politicians from John Adams to John Witherspoon, magazines from the American Mercury to the Weekly Standard, books from The Conscience of a Conservative to Witness, historical events from the American Revolution to the Vietnam War, social-political philosophies from agrarianism to totalitarianism, concepts from academic freedom to tradition, organizations from the America First Committee to the Young Americans for Freedom—and much else. The most comprehensive encyclopedia of American conservatism yet compiled, it is the editors’ hope and belief that the volume will be of value to all students, journalists, academics, and lay readers interested in what has probably been the most important intellectual movement of the last fifty years.

The criterion for an entry’s inclusion in this encyclopedia was deceptively simple: the topic under consideration must have been of substantial importance to the shaping of postwar American conservatism considered primarily in its intellectual (rather than simply its political or social) aspect. This means that there is (a) a prejudice against conservative politicians and pundits who have not clearly had a deep and lasting influence on conservatism, (b) a prejudice against foreign figures, unless they had a major impact on postwar American conservative thought (the only non-American politician included here, besides Edmund Burke, is Margaret Thatcher), and (c) a pronounced bias towards the years since 1945. Publications, persons, and events prior to 1945 were included only if they had a significant bearing on conservatism in America since the end of World War II. Furthermore, in order to limit the scope of the project, the editors decided that, with very few exceptions (most of which pertain to the founders and earlier American figures), only books, persons, events, etc., to have emerged since the Constitution was ratified in 1789 would be included. Thus, there are no entries on such figures as Plato, Aquinas, Locke, or Hume,
and none on such events as the Renaissance, Reformation, Counter-Reformation, or Glorious Revolution of 1688.

As we have already intimated, there is today—and always has been—much debate as to what is and is not authentic conservatism. It is not the intent of this encyclopedia to adjudicate this debate; a rather broad meaning of conservatism is here taken for granted. The intent of this volume is to provide coverage of those matters of importance to each of the major schools of postwar conservative thought and to do so as evenhandedly as possible.

This is not to say that in the entries included here the reader will not encounter specific points of view. Far from it. The editors understand that some articles are more neutral in tone than others. In fact, they relish the strong opinions that often are on display, which they believe has made for a more interesting volume than would have been the case had contributors been forced into the iron cage of a supposed neutrality. To the editors’ minds, at least, it is more important that a variety of points of view are present and accounted for: anarchist, classical-liberal, secular, religious, populist, aristocratic, Straussian, Voegelinian, Reaganite, antiinterventionist, interventionist, modernist, antimodernist, fusionist, agrarian, industrialist, southern, northern, and so on. But they have striven to see that each article is, so far as it goes, accurate and fair in its treatment of its subject, even if the subject is approached from a perspective with which not all conservatives would agree. Only views that seemed to be clearly beyond the pale of mainstream conservative thought have been intentionally excluded. In other words, the editors have resisted allowing the volume, taken as a whole, to present the story of American conservatism as an unwaveringly straight line from Goldwater to Reagan to George W. Bush, or from the founding of National Review to, say, the advent of Rush Limbaugh. The story is more complicated than that . . . and more interesting.

The reader will find at the end of almost every entry in this encyclopedia a list of articles and books for further reading. The reader should note that, in the interest of conserving space, these “further reading” sections do not include references mentioned in the entries themselves. The reader will also find after each entry a list of other entries to consult that touch on the topic at hand.

The bulk of this volume notwithstanding, we are acutely aware that there are dozens of important persons, concepts, and publications not profiled here that might well have been included. In order to keep the size of the project manageable, the editors decided to employ a strong bias toward including only
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those living men and women whose careers were sufficiently advanced to allow for an adequate assessment of their contributions. Similarly, in the last quarter-century there has been such a proliferation of conservative institutes, centers, publications, and now blogs that it became impossible to include all of them in this volume. Thus, the editors have chosen to focus principally on more venerable institutions and publications, those which seem already to have reached a kind of “canonical” place in the bibliography of conservatism. We welcome the reactions and suggestions of readers, which will be gratefully considered as we plan a projected, and clearly necessary, second volume.